robô cria serigrafia contra as touradas.

Serigrafia sobre papel "criada pelo robô ISU em colaboração com Leonel Moura".

Assim o diz Leonel Moura.

Digam-me: poderemos verdadeiramente dizer que o robô criou uma serigrafia anti-tourada?

5 comentários:

Anónimo disse...

Pena o "Robot" não ter escrito "O Vitorino é que me meteu nisto. Estava a correr bem. E teria muito por onde crescer. Agora já não sei o que faço"

Porfirio Silva disse...

Vitorino, acho que sei mais ou menos do que estás a falar, mas não vou comentar aqui sobre isso...

Anónimo disse...

Ah sim, naturalmente. Abraço.

Anónimo disse...

"Digam-me: poderemos verdadeiramente dizer que o robô criou uma serigrafia anti-tourada?"

Boa pergunta, que cada vez melhor se torna se considerarmos o que nestas actividades de produção de significado por parte de máquinas pode ainda evoluir.

@ http://www.lacan.com/pfallerf.htm

"In a brilliant interpretation of Ridley Scott's movie "Blade Runner", Slavoj Zizek has shown that the plot of this film is, at various points, a reprise of the problematic developed in Descartes' "Meditations".2

The movie, as we know, deals with an imminent future where, among the earth's population there are a number of artificial beings ("replicants") who, resembling humans and even having artificial childhood memories (although they were assembled as adult machines), are misperceived, and misperceive themselves, as human beings. But, since they are capable of high intellectual performance, they themselves have their doubts, as in Descartes' second meditation, about the authenticity of their memories as well as their whole (human) subjectivity.3 So, once again, a point has to be found that escapes this universal doubt. Zizek writes:

Therein consists the implicit philosophical lesson of Blade Runner attested to by numerous allusions to the Cartesian cogito (like when the replicant-character played by Darryl Hannah ironically points out 'I think, therefore I am'): where is the cogito, the point of my self-consciousness, when everything that I actually am is an artifact - not only my body, my eyes, but even my most intimate memories and fantasies?4

The Cartesian answer can be explained, as Zizek shows, by applying a conceptual tool which has been developed by Jacques Lacan:5

It is here that we again encounter the Lacanian distinction between the subject of enunciation and the subject of the enunciated: everything that I positively am, every enunciated content I can point at and say 'that's me,' is not 'I'; I am only the void that remains, the empty distance toward every content.6"

Robert Pfaller


- João.

Anónimo disse...

E Viva Barrancos.

as)J (Barranquenho)